Tim Keller as a Successor to Van Til: A Heart-Breakingly, Inordinately High Estimate of Philosophy (5)

One of the most troubling aspects of what I see happening in conservative, Reformed circles of Christians today is the level of authority given to philosophy. As critical as he may have been toward philosophy, historically speaking, Van Til’s presuppositionalism tends to go hand in hand with an inordinately high estimate of philosophy.

One observes this, for instance, in Tim Keller’s otherwise excellent work, The Reason for God. In a section of that book entitled, “Intermission,” after he had set forth compelling reasons for the Christian faith, Keller reveals his understanding of the nature of truth, particularly, with respect to the weight one may reasonably place on reasoning itself in presenting a case for Christianity to unbelievers. Keller writes:

Despite all the books calling Christians to provide proofs for their beliefs, you won’t see philosophers doing so, not even the most atheistic. The great majority think that strong rationalism is nearly impossible to defend....Strong rationalism also assumes that it is possible to achieve “the view from nowhere,” a position of almost complete objectivity, but virtually all philosophers today agree that is impossible. We come to every individual evaluation with all sorts of experiences and background beliefs that strongly influence our thinking and the way our reason works. It is not fair, then, to demand an argument that all rational people would have to bow to (p. 118). 

What Keller is telling us (again, consistent with Van Til’s presuppositionalism) is that all the proofs or reasons for the fundamentals of the Christian faith he has presented so far in his book do not have some objective, rational, or absolute status as truth for everyone. That sort of thing is impossible. There is, in his view, no one rationality which all people share. We can only show the coherence (or systematic wholeness or reasonableness) of our worldview as Christians. 

This means, by implication, that this accounts for all Keller is actually doing in his Reasons for God. In other words, Keller believes that we cannot consider the conclusions we argue for as what should be, are, or could be rationally compelling for everyone regardless of their worldview. Instead, truth (as Keller implies) is relative to one’s perspective (a belief called “perspectivism”). This is because one’s perspective, according to that belief, is everything in determining what truth is. We can’t see outside our perspective.

So, to reiterate (and by his own admission), what Keller is doing in Reasons for God is not presenting conclusions supported by evidence and reason in a manner that cuts across different worldviews to appeal to a shared, knowable ground of reality (or truth) regardless of one’s worldview. In Keller's view, people can hear all that he is arguing for in this book and still be excused, in a sense, for their unbelief simply because they have a different worldview. Theirs is a different rationality or way of looking at life. The subjective conditions of knowing will not permit them to know objective reality.

As an aside: we may notice here in this case that as Keller basically agrees with what Van Til says about there being no common ground of truth between a believer and an unbeliever that Keller (like The Gospel Coalition in their foundational document on "truth") does not bother to qualify this by saying it is only true “in principle.” The “in principle” card seems to be played only when the denial of such a common ground for truth is challenged.

Continuing with the quotation from Keller,  one notices that the same problem I highlighted earlier about Van Til’s presuppositionalism applies to Keller here as well. I mean that Keller in the above excerpt fails to account for what the apostles were actually doing in the  Acts of the Apostles.  As stated before, it is impossible to read sermon after sermon by the apostles in that book and not see that they accept and employ what Keller rejects as a philosophically indefensible, “strong rationalism.” The apostles consistently presented evidence of fulfilled prophecy and their own eye witness testimony to the people concerning Jesus of Nazareth as God’s Messiah and then at times even rebuked people for their hardened hearts, if they did not accept the conclusion supported by their reasoning (Acts 7:51-53; 13:40-41).

Consequently, if one applies what Keller says about the indefensibility of “strong rationalism” to the evangelistic work of the apostles, there is the clear and unmistakable implication that the apostles simply didn’t know what they were doing. They didn’t know the nature of truth. This is because apparently they had not learned from philosophers like Protagorus and Pyrhho (the ancient Greek precursors for modern philosophers like Descartes and Kant) who could have, presumably, "enlightened" the apostles about truth. The apostles, in that case, would have known that people have different perspectives and a strong rational case that Jesus is Lord is impossible. That the apostles cared not at all what Protagorus and Pyrhho thought about truth is obvious. They simply present evidence from prophecy and their own eyewitness testimony that Jesus is Lord. As far as they were concerned, on that basis alone belief in Jesus was warranted. If people didn't believe on that basis, they were without excuse before God. 

Observing Keller, therefore, as in some sense a successor to Van Til, one sees not only this hybrid of philosophy and Reformed theology (the denial of common ground for truth, etc.) but a bold appeal to (or reliance upon) the authority of the philosophers to renounce any Christian assumption that there can be a “strong rationalism” in presenting God’s case for Jesus as the Messiah.  Surely this should make us pause. One never finds, for instance, such an inordinate respect for philosophers in apologists like Francis Schaeffer or C.S. Lewis. They knew that many of the philosophers were relativists. They didn't hesitate to say that the philosophers were wrong. (Read , for example, Schaeffer's The God Who Is There or Lewis's The Abolition of Man.) Nor does one find this sort of inappropriate respect for the philosophers in Reformation leaders like Calvin and Luther.  Again, these reformers knew philosophy well enough. They weren't ignorant of what philosophy has to offer. It is just that when it comes to an understanding of truth they knew better than to make an appeal to the philosophers. 

And this leads me to my final thought which is more personal: I must confess that this is one of the most disturbing things I have ever experienced in my life among conservative, Christian, Reformed people. I live with an ongoing anguish in my heart about it. That a greatly admired pastor among us could make his case for the nature  of truth or knowledge based on what "the philosophers are doing," and that Reformed folks could receive such a claim with general silence, undisturbed equilibrium, and apparent agreement — this, I say, breaks my heart.

Is there no one able to read the writing on the wall? Do we not see what this means? Where it leads? Just when we need sola Scriptura the most, where is it? Are we really okay with Scripture plus philosophy? Where are the Reformed people who threw on the brakes — left tire marks for half a mile — and couldn't (for the love of truth) keep from dissenting:

"Say, what? Did you just appeal not (as we might have expected) to the standard of Scripture but to the majority report from philosophers today for what we should believe as Christians about the nature of truth and what can be expected of reasoning when it comes to making the biblical case for the gospel to unbelievers? And did you not stop to think about what you are implying about Scripture, namely, that it is insufficient for the faith and practice of believers, especially when it comes to evangelism? Or did you not stop to consider what the majority report of philosophers may be tomorrow on the nature of truth or what one can expect from reasoning and evidence in that regard? And have you forgotten that philosophy, for the most part, has never been on friendly terms with Christianity? That there just might be something in philosophy's proposals on the nature of truth and rationality that deeply undermines the church's integrity and quite significant role in the world as the pillar and foundation of the truth?"